The Zero-Day Ledger: How Commercial Spyware Vendors Out-Exploited State Espionage
For the first time, mercenary surveillance vendors were attributed more exploited zero-days than any state espionage group. The Intellexa leaks and Paragon's own admissions show why accountability has not kept pace with capability.

Key findings
- ›Google Threat Intelligence Group attributed 15 confirmed and 3 likely zero-days to commercial surveillance vendors in 2025 — more than any state-sponsored espionage group.
- ›The Intellexa Leaks show a sanctioned vendor retaining remote visibility into Predator customer logs, undermining the due-diligence story the industry sells.
- ›Paragon's chief executive has conceded the company has no technical way to know who its customers target, relying instead on suspending support and updates.
- ›Sanctions target corporate entities; the capability, the engineers and the customer relationships move. Enforcement without technical visibility remains the core gap.
- ›High-risk users should assume zero-click compromise is possible and build detection, device separation and evidence preservation into their routine.
For as long as the commercial surveillance industry has existed, its defenders have offered the same reassurance: this is intelligence-grade tooling sold to vetted governments, governed by contracts, end-user certificates and human-rights clauses. The events of the past twelve months have made that reassurance harder to sustain — not because the industry collapsed, but because the paper trail finally caught up with the technology.
The number that changed the argument
Google's Threat Intelligence Group closed out 2025 with a statistic that reframes the entire market. Of the zero-days it could attribute to a specific actor, 15 confirmed and 3 likely were the work of commercial surveillance vendors — 34.9 percent of attributions — against 12 confirmed and 3 likely for traditional state-sponsored espionage groups. It was the first year the mercenary trade out-exploited the states it sells to.
That inversion matters for a simple reason. A state espionage unit has a foreign ministry, a budget line and a chain of command that can be named in a sanctions order. A spyware vendor has a sales pipeline, a support contract and, increasingly, a private-equity owner. When the most productive exploit developers on earth sit inside the second category, the instruments of accountability are aimed at the wrong target.
What the Intellexa Leaks actually showed
In December 2025, Inside Story, Haaretz and the WAV Research Collective published a joint investigation into Intellexa, the vendor behind Predator, with technical analysis provided by Amnesty International. The leaked material described an operation that had not been slowed by the US Treasury sanctions imposed on the company and its founder.
Two findings stand out. The first is commercial: the ecosystem was still acquiring expensive new zero-days to keep Predator viable, burning them in the field rather than sitting on inventory. The second is structural, and it goes to the heart of the industry's due-diligence claims.
"The fact that, at least in some cases, Intellexa appears to have retained the capability to remotely access Predator customer logs – allowing company staff to see details of surveillance operations and targeted individuals – raises questions about its own human rights due diligence processes." — Amnesty International, December 2025
Read that carefully. A vendor that can reach into a customer's operational logs is not a vendor that cannot see who is being targeted. The industry's standard defence — we sell a capability, we do not control its use — depends on a technical blindness that, in at least this case, appears to have been optional.
Google's own threat researchers have documented the second half of the pattern: after advertising-ecosystem accounts linked to Intellexa's delivery infrastructure were shut down, the operation rebuilt elsewhere. Takedowns create friction. They do not create a kill switch.
Paragon, Graphite and the accountability gap
The more revealing case is the one where the vendor chose to speak.
Paragon Solutions, acquired in December 2024 by the US equity firm AE Industrial Partners and merged with the offensive cyber company REDLattice, spent years positioning itself as the responsible end of the market. Then WhatsApp alleged that Graphite, its mobile spyware, had been used against more than 60 people across more than 20 countries, including journalists and civil-society figures. Italy acknowledged that seven people had been targeted and denied unlawful surveillance, while its parliamentary intelligence oversight committee, COPASIR, examined the matter. Within a week of the allegation, Paragon cancelled its two Italian contracts.
What followed was more instructive than the cancellation. In an interview with WIRED published on 1 October 2026, Paragon's chief executive acknowledged that the company has no technical means of determining whether a customer has misused its software, because it cannot see who customers target or what data they extract. There is no system-wide kill switch. The strongest remedy available is to suspend support and updates until a deployment becomes ineffective.
Paragon did not conduct its own technical investigation before terminating the Italian relationship, and did not seek data from WhatsApp or the Citizen Lab to establish what had happened. The company's public position is that it enforces its terms through contractual restrictions. The implication is unavoidable: in the one case where a vendor was invited to prove its controls worked, the answer was that the controls are contractual rather than technical.
Meanwhile the ownership structure has changed what "accountability" even means. REDLattice announced plans in September 2026 to become a public company. Spyware is becoming an asset class with quarterly reporting, which brings a new set of stakeholders — investors, auditors, boards — into a debate that was previously confined to human-rights lawyers and intelligence committees.
Three structural problems, none of them solved
First, enforcement without visibility. Sanctions designate companies and individuals. Capability resides in engineers, source code and customer relationships, all of which are portable. Every round of designations is followed by a round of corporate restructuring.
Second, delivery innovation. Vendors no longer depend on a single infection vector. Google's researchers have repeatedly documented the use of advertising and content-delivery infrastructure to profile and infect targets at scale — a model that does not require the target to be interesting until the moment of delivery.
Third, evidentiary asymmetry. A targeted journalist usually cannot prove what happened to their phone. A vendor says it cannot see what its customers do. A government says its surveillance was lawful. The only party with the complete picture is the one with the least incentive to publish it.
What defenders and editors should do
- Treat zero-click as a live threat model for high-risk users, not a hypothetical. Patch latency is the single most controllable variable; an unpatched messaging or browser pipeline is the most common entry point in documented cases.
- Separate identities and devices. A phone that receives hostile media should not also hold the source list. Hardware separation is unglamorous and effective.
- Preserve, do not wipe. When compromise is suspected, stop using the device and hand it to a forensic examiner. Amnesty Security Lab's MVT and the Citizen Lab's published indicators are starting points, not conclusions.
- Log and retain what you can. Network logs, device inventories and access records are what turn an allegation into a finding.
- Ask procurement questions with technical answers. Does the vendor have visibility into customer tasking? Can it revoke a deployment remotely? Who audits the audit? A contract clause is not a control.
- Fund the researchers. Citizen Lab, Amnesty Security Lab and the journalists who work with leaked internal files are, functionally, the only external audit this industry has.
The lesson of the past year is not that spyware is unstoppable. It is that the market has matured faster than the mechanisms meant to constrain it — and that the most credible reporting on it now comes from the people it is used against.
Frequently asked
Sources
- [1]Amnesty International — Intellexa Leaks investigation
- [2]Google Threat Intelligence — Sanctioned but Still Spying: Intellexa's Prolific Zero-Day Exploits Continue
- [3]Google Threat Intelligence Group — 2025 Zero-Days in Review
- [4]WIRED — The Secrets of the US Spyware King
- [5]Digital Watch — Paragon acknowledges it cannot detect misuse of Graphite


